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We study optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy (SOE) with sovereign and private default
risk. The SOE's government uses linear taxation to fund exogenous expenditures and uses public debt
to inter-temporally allocate tax distortions. We characterize a class of environments in which the tax
on labor goes to zero in the long run, while the tax on capital income may be non-zero, reversing the
standard prediction of the Ramsey tax literature.  The zero labor tax is an optimal long run outcome
if the private agents are impatient relative to the international interest rate and the economy is subject
to sovereign debt constraints.  The front loading of labor taxes allows the economy to build a large
(aggregate) debt position in the presence of limited commitment.  We show that a similar result holds
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Economies frequently pursue policies that lead to ﬁscal crises, usually typiﬁed by sus-
tained deﬁcits that eventually lead to an inability to increase or roll-over debt (without
paying an historically abnormal premium), and an associated sharp increase in tax rates
and decline in government expenditure. The recent experience of Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal, are only the latest examples of such crises. See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) for
many more examples from the historical record. Policies that run up debt, and even-
tually encounter borrowing constraints, may be the rational response of citizens (and
their politicians) who face a world interest rate that is below their subjective rate of time
preference. However, the normative question of whether the observed policies of front
loading consumption and back loading taxes is indeed optimal in such an environment
has not been thoroughly studied. To this end, this paper studies optimal ﬁscal policy
in economies that are debt constrained, with a speciﬁc interest in relatively “impatient”
economies for which the debt constraints are particularly relevant.
We consider optimal ﬁscal policy in a linear-tax framework. The canonical Ramsey
formulation of optimal ﬁscal policy is quite simple: a government funds ﬁscal expendi-
tures using linear taxes, and chooses the sequence of taxes that maximizes the welfare of
the representative private citizen. A well known result in this framework is that capital
taxes should be zero in the long run if the economy converges to a steady state (Judd,
1985; Chamley, 1986; Atkeson et al., 1999), and that taxes on labor income should be
“smoothed” using government debt (Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Ljungqvist and Sargent,
2004). That is, if a steady state exists, the government will rely solely on labor taxes.1 This
prediction is robust to dropping the Ramsey assumption of full commitment, as shown
by Dominguez (2007) and Reis (2008). There are a number of alternative environments
in which capital is taxed in the steady state, but our focus is not solely the role of capital
taxes in a steady state, but also the role of labor taxes.
This paper explores several variations of the canonical framework. At their core, each
variation shares the fact that the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of
private agents may differ from the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) in the long run.
In particular, agents are impatient relative to the inter-temporal price of resources. The
greater impatience may reﬂect higher mortality in developing economies, imperfect al-
truism, or simple preference heterogeneity (with large/rich countries being rich because
1If labor is a type of capital, as in environments in which human capital can be accumulated, then labor
taxes may also go to zero for the same reason that capital taxes go to zero. See Jones et al. (1997).
2they have patient agents). Alternatively, countries with weaker domestic ﬁnancial mar-
kets may export their savings, putting downward pressure on the world interest rate
faced by citizens and governments in the rest of the world (Caballero et al., 2008, Men-
doza et al., 2009). In this spirit, our primary scenario is a small open economy in which
private agents discount at a rate that differs from the world interest rate. If a government
faces a borrowing constraint, agents would like to pursue a declining path of consump-
tion given the world interest rate, but are eventually constrained from doing so. Our main
result is that in such an environment the tax on labor income converges to zero. That is,
the optimal response to impatience and borrowing constraints is to front load taxes, driv-
ing labor taxes to zero in the limit.
The result is quite general in that the exact mechanism which drives a wedge between
the MRS and the MRT is unimportant. An alternative scenario to a debt constrained small
open economy is a closed economy in which the government discounts future consump-
tion differently than the private agents. For example, if time indexes different generations
and private agents are altruistic, then the inter-generational Pareto problem may feature
a welfare function with weights on future period utility that are possibly higher than the
weights implied by private altruism (e.g., as considered by Phelan, 2006 and Farhi and
Werning, 2007, in models of private information). The optimal ﬁscal policy in such an
economy (eventually) involves a subsidy to capital to sustain the required consumption
of future generations. Our results show that, in addition, the labor tax must converge to
zero.
The intuition of the result begins with the fact that the economy ultimately faces a
borrowing constraint. The class of borrowing constraints we consider are motivated by
the need for debt to be “self-enforcing;” that is, utility is at least as great by paying back
the debt than it is from defaulting. The appeal of self-enforcing constraints stems from
the practical limits of enforcing international debt contracts. We model the constraints in
a fairly general way, but at their essence they involve placing a lower bound on equilib-
rium utility. Impatience absent a borrowing constraint involves long run immiseration,
an outcome that will be inconsistent with realistic enforcement mechanisms.
To the extent possible, the optimal response to impatience is to front load consump-
tion and leisure. The ﬂip side of this is to exhaust the economy’s borrowing capacity. For
a given level of utility, an undistorted allocation of labor maximizes output, and there-
fore maximizes the amount of debt that can be serviced. In particular, the borrowing
constraint places a ﬂoor on utility, while the efﬁcient allocation ensures that this utility
is delivered in a way that maximizes long run debt payments, freeing up resources for
3early consumption. The zero labor tax in the long run is simply the mechanism through
which ﬁscal policy exhausts the front-loading capacity of the economy’s debt constraint.
Viewed from the international bond market’s perspective, the more the government is
willing to front load taxation, the more the ﬁnancial markets will be willing to lend. The
closed economy result has a similar intuition. The optimal ﬁscal policy delivers the de-
sired level of inter-generational altruism in a way that minimizes the need to pass-on
physical capital.
In our framework, there is an aggregate borrowing constraint which involves both
private and public debt, as both state variables determine the relative beneﬁts of repay-
ment versus default. As noted above, the optimal ﬁscal policy maximizes the long run
aggregate debt of the economy. However, this does not necessarily imply large public
debt positions. Indeed, the fact that labor taxes are zero in the long run requires the ﬁscal
authority to fund government expenditures from net claims on private agents (and for-
eigners) plus any net tax receipts from capital income. We explore an example economy
in which the government runs ﬁscal surpluses on the transition to the steady state. It is
the private sector that is indebted in the long run, not the ﬁscal authority. Private debt
is consistent with efﬁcient output, while ﬁscal debt limits the economy’s debt servicing
capacity due to the need for distortionary taxes.
The normative implications of our model therefore stand in stark contrast to many
observed ﬁscal trajectories. The optimal policies studied in this paper involve front load-
ing labor taxes, and, correspondingly, reducing the available tax revenue to fund long
run ﬁscal expenditures and to pay interest on public debt. Viewed through our model,
observed ﬁscal crises typiﬁed by large pubic debt positions and sharp increases in labor
tax rates are not consistent with the optimal response to impatience and debt constraints.
We partially bridge this gap by considering an unanticipated and uninsured “bailout,” in
which a fraction of private debt becomes public debt. The standard incomplete markets
intuition (as in Barro (1979)) is that labor taxes adjust up and stay high thereafter to ﬁ-
nance the increased stock of government debt. The presence of meaningful long-run debt
constraints, however, results in short run labor taxes “overshooting” their long run level,
reﬂecting the need to front load. This allows the economy to continue to borrow despite
the shock to public debt.
We stress that we hew fairly closely to the standard Ramsey framework and its close
variants. That is, taxation is linear by assumption. We do allow for limited commitment
and consider taxes supported by reputational equilibria, as well as incorporate alternative
political economy frictions. However, we do not address issues of private information,
4heterogeneity, and incompleteness of asset markets. It is well known in these models
that optimal capital taxes may not be set to zero in the long run. We leave for future
research whether our other normative results, including the zero labor tax, carry over to
such environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model
environment; section 3 characterizes the optimal ﬁscal policy in an open economy setting;
section 4 presents a quantitative analysis of the optimal policy and discusses the optimal
ﬁnancing of bailouts; section 5 extends the benchmark model to include private debt
constraints (section 5.1) and to a closed economy environment (section 5.2); and section 6
concludes. The appendix contains all proofs.
2 Environment
In this section we describe the environment faced by households, ﬁrms, and the govern-
ment. The key departure from the standard framework concerns debt constraints, which
are introduced at the sovereign level. We restrict attention to the a deterministic environ-
ment. In this section, we focus on a small open economy, which faces an exogenous world
interest rate r?
t . We characterize the closed economy model in section 5.2.
2.1 Representative Household
The representative private household has time-separable preferences with utility over






with b 2 (0,1).
We impose the following restrictions:
Assumption 1. The utility function u satisﬁes the following conditions: (i) u : X ! R where
X  (0,¥)(0, ¯ n) with 0 < ¯ n  ¥; (ii) u is twice differentiable with uc > 0, un < 0, ucc < 0,
unn < 0 and uccunn  (ucn)2 > 0 for all c,n 2 X; (iii) consumption and leisure are normal goods,
uccun   ucnuc  0 and unnuc   ucnun  0 for all c,n 2 X; and (iv) u satisﬁes the following
5boundednessassumptiononpreferences: both ucc(ucc/uc  ucn/un) and ucn(ucn/uc  unn/un)
are bounded functions in (c,n) 2 (ec,¥)  (0,en) for some ec > 0, en 2 (0, ¯ n).
The ﬁrst three assumptions are standard. The last assumption insures that certain key
expressions remain well behaved as consumption becomes large or labor approaches
zero. This latter assumption holds for several of the preferences commonly used in the
macroeconomics literature. For example, if utility takes the usual Cobb-Douglas form
(cg(1  n)1 g)1 s/(1  s) with g 2 (0,1) and s > 0, or the power-separable form
c1 s/(1  s)   yn1+g/(1+ g) with s,g,y > 0, then the conditions in Assumption 1
are satisﬁed.
For what follows, we will assume that the consumers are more impatient that the
world ﬁnancial markets in the limit:
Assumption 2 (Impatient Consumers). There exists M > 0 and T such that 1 > M >
b(1+ r?
t ) for all t > T.
The focus of the paper is to understand the role this assumption plays in tax smoothing,
and we will contrast the results with those from the standard assumption b(1 + r?
t ) = 1
as we proceed.
The household provides labor in a competitive domestic labor market at a wage wt,
and labor is immobile across borders. Without loss of generality, we assume labor taxes
are levied on the ﬁrms, so wt represents wages after taxes.
Let rt denote the net interest rate (before-taxes) received by consumers on their ﬁnan-
cial assets from time t   1 to t. No arbitrage implies rt = r?
t in an open economy. Let rk
t
denote the rental rate of the domestic capital stock owned by consumers, and d its depre-
ciation rate. Let fk
t represents the residence-based tax on capital income received in time
t, where “residence-based” refers to the fact that domestic agents pay this tax regardless
of the source of the capital income or its location. We introduce “source-based” taxation
in the ﬁrm’s problem below. No arbitrage between bonds and physical capital implies
that the after tax return is equalized:
1+ (1  fk





t = rt + d. (2)









We normalize p0 = 1. We let at denote the wealth of agents, including both ﬁnancial
wealth and capital holdings, net of capital income taxes. To be precise about the timing, if
x is invested at the end of period t   1, the pre-tax wealth in period t is (1+ rt)x, and the
after-tax wealth is at = (1 + rt)x   ftrtx = (1 + (1   ft)rt)x. The ﬂow budget constraint
of the consumer can be expressed:
at+1 = (1+ (1  fk
t+1)rt+1)(at   ct + wtnt + Tt), (4)
where Tt  0 denotes a non-negative lump-sum transfer from the government at time t.
Beginning from an initial wealth a0 and imposing a No Ponzi condition, the present-value




pt (ct   wtnt   Tt)  a0. (BC)
Note that our notation implies that a0 is net of period-0 capital taxes. As is well known,
distortionary taxation can be avoided with a large enough initial capital levy. By starting
from an a0 such that distortionary taxes are still required, we are implicitly following the
standard practice of assuming a bound on the initial capital levy. To be explicit, assume
fk
0 = 0, which is without loss of generality given that a0 is treated as an arbitrary initial
condition.2
Our benchmark environment assumes that private agents do not face constraints on
borrowing. We revisit this assumption in section 5.1. To anticipate, we show that it is
sufﬁcient to consider a representative private agent who ignores the presence of debt con-
straints. In particular, we show that any competitive equilibrium allocation that satisﬁes
a private debt constraint can be implemented as an equilibrium in which household’s do
not directly face a borrowing constraint. This is true because the effect of a private debt
constraint on consumer behavior can be replicated by a tax on borrowing plus a lump
sum rebate of this tax revenue. However, the presence of private debt constraints alters
the government’s problem, as discussed below.
2This is without loss of generality for the consumer’s problem. For the government’s problem intro-
duced below, we can adjust period-0 ﬁscal requirements to reﬂect any initial capital tax revenue, making
the zero tax without loss of generality for that problem as well.
7The household’s problem is to choose sequences fctg and fntg to maximize (1) subject
to (BC). This is a standard convex problem that can be solved using Lagrange multiplier
techniques. Let q be the multiplier on the budget constraint. The ﬁrst order conditions for
each t can be written as:
btuc(ct,nt) = qpt (5)
btun(ct,nt) =  qptwt. (6)
These conditions plus the constraints are necessary and sufﬁcient for the unique solution
to the household’s problem.
Note that q > 0, given the strict monotonicity of u, and so the budget constraint holds




bt(uc(ct,nt)(ct   Tt) + un(ct,nt)nt) = uc(c0,n0)a0. (7)
As usual, this equation will later form the basis of the “implementability condition” used
in Proposition 1.
2.2 Firms
The representative ﬁrm operates a constant returns to scale production function F(k,n)
and hires labor and rents capital in competitive factor markets to maximize proﬁts. It
pays a linear source-based tax tn
t on its wage bill and a source-based tax tk
t on its rental




F(kt,nt)   (1+ tn





where wt is the wage and rk
t the rental rate.
The ﬁrst order conditions, necessary and sufﬁcient, are:
Fk(kt,nt) = (1+ tk
t )rk
t (8)
Fn(kt,nt) = (1+ tn
t )wt. (9)
82.3 Government Budget Constraints
The government has to fund a sequence of expenditures gt, which we take to follow a
deterministic and exogenous process.3
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where b0 is the initial debt of the government. Recall that at is after-tax period-t wealth, so
the initial amount invested at the end of period t   1 is at/(1+ (1  fk
t)rt), which is the
tax base for residence-based capital taxation in the expression above. Note as well that
we are allowing free disposal of government income.
2.4 Government’s Lack of Commitment
The Ramsey approach to optimal ﬁscal policy assumes the government can commit to
a sequence of tax, transfers and debt repayment promises. We are interested, however,
in environments in which the government lacks commitment. Towards that goal, we
consider the following sovereign constraints, that take the form:
Wt(fusg¥
s=t,kt)  0, for t 2 f0,1,...g (12)
where ut = u(ct,nt).
Werestrictattentiontoforward-lookingconstraintsthatplacealowerboundonutility,
rather than an upper bound. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
Assumption 3. Wt is differentiable in all its arguments and ¶Wt/¶us  0 for all t  0 and
s  t; with ¶Wt/¶ut > 0 for all t  0.
3Itispossibletomake gt anendogenouschoicewithsome(potentiallytimevarying)utilityvalue. Asour
main result holds for arbitrary sequences of government expenditure (subject to boundedness conditions
on the equilibrium allocation), we simply treat public expenditures as a primitive.
9A straightforward interpretation of these sovereign constraints is a limited commit-
ment environment in which the government cannot commit to its promises on taxes and
debt. Consider thus the game played by the government, the representative agent and
the international ﬁnancial markets. Suppose that if the government in power at time t
deviates from a prescribe allocation (for example, by defaulting on the debt or expropri-
ating capital), it can guarantee itself a deviation utility Ut(kt). Then, a constraint of the
type above ensures that allocation is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium. In section 5.1
we show that such a constraint also arises when the government has the ability (but not
necessarily the desire) to enforce private debt contracts with international ﬁnancial mar-
kets. With this interpretation in mind, we shall refer to these constraints as “sovereign
debt constraints” (SDC).
Moreover, theconstraintscanaccommodatepoliticaleconomydistortionsthatinteract
with limited commitment. For example, Aguiar and Amador (2011) introduce constraints





qdj + 1  dj

u(ct+j,nt+j)   Ut(kt)  0,8t  0, (13)
where q and d reﬂect thefact thatpolitical incumbents mayface politicalturnover risk and
prefer consumption to occur during incumbency. Setting q = 1 and d = 0 generates the
limited commitment-benevolent government framework.4 Similarly, Aguiar et al. (2009)




˜ bju(ct+j,nt+j)   Ut(kt)  0,8t  0. (14)
The fact that constraints of the type (12) arise in models of endogenous default moti-
vate the title of the paper. Nevertheless, limited commitment is not the only motivation
for such constraints. In a full commitment environment, there may be reason to incorpo-
rate constraints of that form. For example, consider a dynastic model in which agents
live for one period and bequeath assets to the next generation of the dynasty. Inter-
generational altruism is governed by b. Now consider a Pareto problem in which the
government maximizes the initial generation’s utility as given by equation (1), subject to
giving generation t a utility level of at least Ut. In this environment, the constraint set




bsu(ct+s,nt+s)   Ut  0,8t  1.
These sovereign constraints motivate environments in which the optimal ﬁscal pol-
icy distorts inter-temporal tradeoffs from the perspective of the private agents, whose
decisions underlie the implementability condition. While fairly general, constraints of
the type (12) do not encompass environments in which the government has a direct in-
centive to distort the private agent’s static labor-leisure choice. That is, Wt depends on
consumption and labor through the utility function u(c,n), but not directly. This rules
out situations in which labor supply and labor taxes are not chosen simultaneously (so
nt affects off-equilibrium payoffs, as in Acemoglu et al., 2008 and Acemoglu et al., 2011),
or environments in which the government wants to manipulate relative factor prices (see
the discussion of this in regard to private debt constraints in section 5.1 below).
With this, we are now ready to deﬁne competitive equilibrium in the next sub-section.
2.5 Competitive Equilibrium
We are interested in allocations that can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. For the
open-economy benchmark economy, we assume the world interest rate is given by r?
t . No
arbitrage implies that rt = r?
t . The representative household’s and government’s budget




qt (ct + gt + (r?
t + d)kt   F(kt,nt))  A0. (RC?)
where A0 is the initial wealth of the economy: A0 = a0   b0. Note that for the open
economy case, the relevant state variable is total wealth. In particular, ﬁrms can rent
capital from foreigners and domestic agents can trade their physical capital for foreign
assets, and so the initial physical capital stock k0 is an equilibrium outcome and not a
predetermined variable.
We deﬁne a competitive equilibrium in the standard fashion, augmented by the pres-
ence of the sovereign debt constraints:
Deﬁnition 1. An open economy competitive equilibrium with an initial asset position (A0,




t g with fk
0 = 0; non-negative
lump-sum transfers fTtg; and quantities fct,nt,ktg such that (i) inter-temporal prices correspond
11to the small open economy assumption: rt = r?
t for all t, and rk
t, pt, qt satisfy equations (2), (3),
and (10); (ii) fct,ntg solve the constrained household problem given initial wealth a0, prices and
taxes; (iii) fnt,ktg solve the ﬁrm’s problem given prices and taxes, that is, equations (8) and (9)
hold; (iv) the government budget constraint (11) holds; (v) the open-economy aggregate resource
constraint (RC?) holds; and (vi) the sovereign debt constraints (12) hold for all t.
Given that the sovereign debt constraints are restrictions on an allocation’s quanti-
ties (ct, nt, kt), it follows that competitive equilibria can be characterized using a primal
approach, as usual:
Proposition 1. An allocation fct,nt,ktg
¥
t=0 can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium if
and only if: (a) the resource constraint (RC?) holds; (b) the sovereign debt constraints (12) hold




bt(uc(ct,nt)ct + un(ct,nt)nt)  uc(c0,n0)a0. (IC)
There are in principle many competitive equilibria. In the next section, we discuss
equilibrium selection.
3 Efﬁcient Allocations
Let us start by deﬁning our notion of efﬁciency:
Deﬁnition 2. An efﬁcient allocation is a competitive equilibrium allocation that maximizes
household’s utility as of time 0.
Note that the economy is populated by a representative agent as well as a sequence of
political incumbents characterized by Wt. This objective function, plus a corresponding
sequence of constraints Wt  0, implies that our notion of efﬁciency can be viewed as
choosing a competitive equilibrium that lies along the Pareto frontier of the initial rep-
resentative household and the sequence of political incumbents.5 It should be clear that
efﬁciency does not imply the lack of political economy distortions in the choice of alloca-
tions.
5 In section 5.2 we reinterpret the Pareto problem as one spanning different generations of private house-
holds, rather than political incumbents, with the objective function representing the ﬁrst generation’s wel-
fare.














F(kt,nt)   ct   gt   (r?
t + d)kt








  uc(c0,n0)a0  0, (P.2)
Wt(fusgst,kt)  0, for all t  0 (P.3)
3.1 Necessary Conditions for an Efﬁcient Allocation
Note that implementability and sovereign debt constraints, (P.2) and (P.3), are not nec-
essarily convex. We proceed by characterizing necessary conditions for an interior op-
timum. Let h denote the multiplier on (P.2), m denote the multiplier on (P.1), and btlt,
t = 0,1,... denote the sequence of multipliers on constraints (P.3).6
The ﬁrst order necessary condition with respect to consumption at time t  1 is:









uc(ct,nt) = qtm. (16)
The ﬁrst term btuc(ct,nt) represents the value of consumption in period t to the consumer
(the objective function). The term following the multiplier h reﬂects the need to satisfy
the implementability condition (P.2). The terms involving Ws represent the fact that in-
creasing consumption in period t relaxes the sovereign constraints in that period, and all
preceding periods to the extent that W is forward looking. The ﬁnal term to the right of
the equal sign is the price of consumption at time t, translated into utility terms via the
multiplier m. Note that for period t = 0, we have the same condition but replace the term
6There are technical conditions that must be met to ensure the validity of Lagrangian methods (these
relate to the usual regularity conditions plus the existence of summable multipliers when facing an inﬁnite
sequence of constraints). In the Appendix, we formally address these issues. For expositional simplicity, in
the text we proceed as if the usual Lagrange multiplier approach is valid.
13multiplying h with
uc(c0,n0) + ucc(c0,n0)(c0   a0) + ucn(c0,n0)n0,
given the presence of uc(c0,n0) on the right hand side of the implementability condition
(P.2).
The ﬁrst order condition for labor is similar:









un(ct,nt) =  Fn(kt,nt)qtm, (17)
for t  1. For t = 0, replace the term multiplying h with ucn(c0,n0)(c0   a0)+un(c0,n0)+
unn(c0,n0)n0.
The ﬁrst order condition for capital is:







Note that capital may be distorted away from the efﬁcient level (Fk = r? + d) as the
sovereign’s debt constraint may depend on the level of installed capital. In particular,
a large capital stock may tempt the government to renege on implicit capital tax promises
(¶Wt/¶kt > 0), leading to downward distortion of investment when (P.3) binds.7
3.2 Optimal Taxation
Using the ﬁrst order conditions, we can characterize properties of optimal ﬁscal policy;







7See Benhabib and Rustichini (1997), Dominguez (2007), Reis (2008), Aguiar et al. (2009), and Aguiar
and Amador (2011) for studies of capital taxation in limited commitment environments.
























From this expression, we see that to the extent the right hand side differs from one, labor
will be distorted by taxation.
Distortionary taxes in (19) stems from h > 0, as the expression in parentheses multi-
plying h is different in the denominator and numerator of (19). Recall that h is the multi-
plier on the implementability condition, which ensures that ﬁscal policy is implemented
in a manner consistent with household and ﬁrm optimization. If the government had
access to lump sum taxation, or had sufﬁcient initial assets to cover expenditures without
distortionary taxes, then h is zero.
However, the fact that h > 0 is not sufﬁcient to conclude that labor is distorted in the
limit. We must ﬁrst analyze the remaining term in (19). In particular, in both the numer-
ator and denominator there are the cumulative sum of non-negative numbers reﬂecting
the sovereign debt constraints: å
t
s=0 bs tls¶Ws/¶ut. If this sum grows without bound,
and the terms involving h are bounded, the expression on the right of (19) converges to
one; that is, the labor tax converges to zero. However, for this sum to diverge, it must be
that the sovereign debt constraints are binding in the long run, and in principle must be
ruling out the Ramsey allocation from the equilibrium set. Note that the Ramsey alloca-
tion prescribes a marginal utility of consumption that increases without bound; that is,
the country immiserates itself. This obviously requires an extreme form of commitment
to the country’s foreign liabilities. As an alternative, we consider allocations where this
does not happen:
Deﬁnition3(NoImmiseration). Anallocationsatisﬁesno-immiserationifliminft!¥ ct > 0
and limsupt!¥ nt < ¯ n;
The lack of commitment provides the natural intuition that a country would rather
repudiate its debt obligations than see consumption and leisure go to zero. A sufﬁcient
condition on the sovereign debt constraints to ensure no-immiseration is:
















  nt = ¯ n   en
o
< 0,
then an efﬁcient allocation must satisfy no-immiseration.
Manystandardframeworkssatisfythiscondition. Forexample, supposeWt  å
¥
s=t qsus 
U(kt) for some discount factor q 2 (0,1) and outside option U(kt) such that (i) U(kt) is
bounded below, and (ii) u is bounded above with limc!0 u(c,n) = limn!¯ n u(c,n) =  ¥;
then an efﬁcient allocation satisﬁes no-immiseration.8
We now show that a non-immiserazing allocation must feature a labor tax that goes to
zero:
Proposition 2. [Zero Labor Tax in the Long Run] Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. If
an efﬁcient allocation exists and satisﬁes no-immiseration, then limt!¥ tn
t = 0.
The proof relies on the fact that Assumption 2 implies that bt/qt converges to zero,
as domestic consumers are impatient relative to the world interest rate. To see why this























The fact that consumption is bounded away from zero and labor bounded away from ¯ n
(no-immiseration), togetherwith m > 0,9 impliestherighthandsideoftheaboveequation
is strictly positive. The fact that bt/qt is converging to zero implies the limit of the sum
must be unbounded (given that Assumption 1 implies that the term multiplying h is
bounded). The unbounded sum reﬂects that the debt constraints are binding in the limit,
with the strictly positive multipliers accumulating over time. Looking back at equation
(19), if the inﬁnite sum diverges, and the terms in brackets remain bounded, then the
labor tax most be going to zero.
8For example, if utility takes the usual Cobb-Douglas form (cg(1  n)1 g)1 s/(1  s) with g 2 (0,1)
and s > 0, or the power-separable form c1 s/(1  s)   yn1+g/(1+ g) with s,g,y > 0, then conditions
(ii) and (iii) hold for s > 1, the empirically relevant value.
9The fact that the resource constraint binds (m > 0) is an intuitive result that we prove in the appendix.
16The standard Ramsey solution can be recovered by setting ls = 0 for all s. In this case,
both sides of (20) converge to zero (while the ratio of qt to btuc may be bounded), and
if h 6= 0 the labor tax wedge may be non-zero. This highlights the fact that the Ramsey
full-commitment allocation without debt constraints does not call for zero labor taxes in
the long run. If b(1 + r?
t ) < 1, the Ramsey allocation calls for increasing marginal utility
of consumption, which violates the no-immiseration condition in the proposition. In the
presence of limited commitment, such a path of consumption is not self-enforcing and the
growing sum of non-zero multipliers reﬂects the presence of the debt constraints.
Note as well that if bR = 1, we have bt/qt = 1 and the terms involving h remain
relevant in the long run. Therefore, labor taxes do not in general converge to zero when
private agents discount at the world interest rate (while capital taxes typically do con-
verge to zero). See Dominguez (2007) and Reis (2008) for the equivalent closed economy
analysis in which the marginal rate of inter-temporal substitution equals the return on
capital in the steady state. When agents are patient, there is no counter-weight to the in-
centive to relax the debt constraints by saving, and the constraints become irrelevant in
the long run (this is an application of the well known “back loading” result of Ray, 2002).
3.3 Front Loading and Debt Constraints
Proposition 2 states that labor is undistorted in the long run if agents are relatively impa-
tient. That is, that labor tax distortions are front loaded. Perhaps one would have thought
thatdistortionsshouldbebackloadedduetoimpatience, orattheleastdistortionsshould
be smoothed to the extent possible. However, agents wish to front load consumption and
leisure. This suggests borrowing to the greatest extent possible subject to the debt con-
straints. The efﬁcient allocation of labor is the counter-part to servicing a large aggregate
debt.
In particular, suppose that the efﬁcient allocation converges to a steady state (c¥, n¥,
k¥), with associated steady state interest rate r? and ﬁscal expenditure g. Suppose as
well that the constraints Wt are weakly decreasing in capital, so more capital tightens the
constraints, although this is not strictly necessary for the following proposition.10 Let B¥
denote the steady state aggregate debt position. From the aggregate resource constraint,
B¥ =
1+ r?
r? [F(k¥,n¥)   c¥   g   (r? + d)k¥].
10If Wt were increasing in k, the proposition holds with the inequality of the last constraint reversed.
17The efﬁcient allocation maximizes steady state debt subject to the debt constraints:
Proposition 3. [Maximal Debt] Suppose the efﬁcient allocation converges to a steady state. Un-
der the conditions of Proposition 2, the efﬁcient allocation converges to the maximal steady state











Note that the constraint set in the maximal debt problem is not a singleton, as there
are many choices of consumption and leisure that deliver the same level of utility. What
the proposition says is that the efﬁcient allocation delivers the steady level of utility in a
manner that maximizes net payments to foreign ﬁnancial markets. The beneﬁt of such an
allocation to an impatient economy is that a large steady state debt ﬁnances front loading
of consumption and leisure. The implication for ﬁscal policy is to leave labor decisions
undistorted to maximize output.
We should emphasize that aggregate debt is maximized in the long run, not govern-
ment debt. The debt referred to in the proposition is the aggregate debt of the country,
which is the sum of private and public foreign liabilities. Even if the decentralization is
such that the only foreign liabilities are government liabilities, these can be balanced by
government claims against the domestic private sector, making the private sector the ul-
timate debtor. Indeed, the fact that the government does not tax labor income in the long
run requires the government to hold enough claims against private agents or foreigners
to fund government expenditures plus any net subsidy to capital income. This generates
the somewhat surprising implication that the government of an impatient economy may
eventually run ﬁscal surpluses on the transition path, a point we discuss in detail in our
example economy below.
From the perspective of the private agents, the efﬁcient allocation also maximizes pri-
vate steady state debt. In particular, the net payments a private agent makes to ﬁnancial
markets (including the capital rental market) at any point in time is wtnt   ct. For a given
level of utility, taxes on labor reduce the available income for net debt payments, and in
this sense zero labor taxes allows private agents to maximize long run debt. In this re-
18gard, we stress that Proposition 2 exploits the fact that private agents are impatient, and
not just (or necessarily) the government. As noted above, the proof of Proposition 2 relies
on the fact that the compounded discount factor relevant for the IC constraint approaches
zero faster than qt, and (IC) is derived from the private agents’ problem independently of
the government’s objective and the debt constraints. In the absence of taxation, private
agents’ would like to pursue a path in which consumption and leisure are front loaded
and long run debt is maximized, and the efﬁcient ﬁscal policy faced with such a constraint
ensures that this is accomplished to the extent allowable.
We note that the desire to minimize long run labor distortions, to service the maximal
long run debt, holds regardless of the discount factor SDC or if we replaced the objective
function with that of a patient agent. It is the private agent’s discount factor present in
the implementability constraint that generates the result. Thus, at the root of the result is
minimizing tax distortions. This begs the question of why a large private sector debt is
the avenue for minimizing tax distortions.
The canonical result in minimizing tax distortions is zero tax on capital and an (ap-
proximately) stable tax on labor. This holds in our framework if the private agents dis-
count at the world interest rate. When the private agent’s are relatively impatient, com-
bined with a lack of commitment, we have that the private agent’s Euler Equation –
evaluated at the world interest rate – must be distorted in the long run. This is true
whether the distortion is implemented by a tax on borrowing or by rationing by the
foreign ﬁnancial markets which lend directly to the private agents (see section 5.1 for
a discussion). Therefore, there is necessarily a ﬁrst order distortion to the private agent’s
Euler Equation stemming from the debt constraint, and a zero-capital-tax steady state is
not self-enforcing. Now suppose that labor taxes were constant, but not zero, in such a
steady state. If a constant labor tax minimizes labor market distortions, a small pertur-
bation will have second order costs. However, as we have shown, a decline in the future
labor tax relaxes the debt constraint today, generating a ﬁrst order gain by reducing the
capital market wedge in the private Euler Equation. Thus, efﬁciency calls for a declining
labor tax wedge that asymptotes to zero.
4 An Example Economy with Sovereign Debt Constraints
We now study a speciﬁc open-economy environment to render the constraints (12) con-
crete and fully characterize the efﬁcient allocation. We also use the example economy to
19study the optimal tax policy to ﬁnance an unanticipated government “bailout” of private
debtors.
4.1 Preferences and Technology
Consider a small open economy without capital and with a linear production technology:
f(n) = n. Assume also that gt is constant and that the economy can borrow from abroad
at a constant risk-free interest rate of R  1+ r?. We impose that bR  1. The per-period








At any point, the government of the economy can decide to cut all access from the
international ﬁnancial markets by defaulting on their external obligations. Such a move
guarantees a utility level of U to the representative agent, where this payoff U can include
the costs of default imposed to the country by the foreigners in a default event. For our
analysis, we do not need to specify anything more about how U gets determined, except
that it places a lower bound on equilibrium consumption and leisure:
Assumption 4. There exists ˜ c > 0 and ˜ n < ¯ n such that U > u(˜ c, ˜ n)/(1  b).
















 U; for all t. (22)












4.2 The Efﬁcient Allocation
The efﬁcient allocation for this economy can then be characterized as follows. Suppose
that constraint (22) is not binding. Then the ﬁrst order condition for consumption, equa-
20tion (16), can be written in this environment as
(bR?)
t (1+ h (1  s)) = mcs
t , while Wt > U,t > 0.
If bR? = 1, then ct is constant, while if bR? < 1, ct is strictly declining due to impatience.
Similarly, the ﬁrst order condition for labor, equation (17), takes the form:
(bR?)
t (1+ h (1+ n)) = w 1mn n
t , while Wt > U,t > 0.
The right hand side is strictly declining in nt. If bR? = 1, then nt is constant, while if
bR? < 1, nt is strictly increasing due to impatience.
The labor tax wedge along this unconstrained path is:
tn
t =
h (n + s)
1+ h(1  s)
, while Wt > U,t > 0.
Regardless of relative impatience, while unconstrained by the borrowing constraint, labor
tax is a constant. If bR? = 1, we see that consumption, labor, and taxes are all constant,
which accords with tax smoothing.
If bR? < 1 taxes are constant while unconstrained, but the fact that ct is falling and nt
is increasing over time implies that ut < ut 1 and this path is not sustainable in the long
run. It must be then that at some point Wt = U by Assumption 4. The following lemma
states that Wt = U is an absorbing state for the utility level:
Lemma 2. Suppose that Wt = U for t > 0, then Wt+s = U for all s > 0.
We can also obtain an explicit solution for the behavior of the labor tax. In our current
environment, ¶Ws/¶ut = bt s for s  t, and zero otherwise. Substituting this into (16)























where we have used that f 0(n) = 1. Taking the ratio of these two expressions to solve for
21the labor tax, we have:
tn
t =
h (n + s)




The fact that lt > 0 whenever the borrowing constraint binds implies that the summation
å
t
j=0 lj is increasing over time along a constrained path, and the labor tax is falling. In
the limit, tn
t = 0, as implied by Proposition 2.
The efﬁcient allocation is graphically depicted in Figure 1. The ﬁgure represents in-
difference curves in consumption-labor space. The curve u  (1   b)U denotes the ﬂow







. We consider the initial allocation (after time 0) at point A, which is
associated with some initial assets in private and public hands (a0, A0).
We overlay the dynamics of the efﬁcient allocation on the indifference curves, using
the ﬁgure as a phase diagram. For ut > u, the allocation is unconstrained by the bor-
rowing limit. As noted above, the unconstrained allocation features falling consumption,
increasing labor, and a constant tax wedge. The constant tax wedge implies parallel shifts
across indifference curves as utility falls. Point B is the ﬁrst point at which utility reaches
u. Once ut = u, utility is constant and we move along the indifference curve. As we move
along, consumption and labor both increase and the tax wedge falls, eventually reaching
zero in the limit. Point C represents the steady state of the economy.
The intuition while the economy is unconstrained by the borrowing limit is straight-
forward. Impatience relative to r? makes a declining path of consumption and leisure
optimal. Standard tax smoothing insights makes a constant tax rate efﬁcient as well. The
fact that the economy ultimately hits the constraint is also straightforward. However, the
question remains why point B is not a steady state. That is, once the economy hits the bor-
rowing constraint, why are there further dynamics, and why do these involve a declining
labor tax and increasing consumption?
The intuition is related to Proposition 3. Output at point B is distorted downward by
labor taxes, reducing the ability of the economy to service a large steady state debt. As
the tax on labor is reduced, output increases. In particular, output increases more than
consumption as long as the tax rate is strictly positive, raising the steady state net exports
(i.e., net debt payments) of the economy. To see that consumption increases less than
output (i.e., labor), note that along the indifference curve, dc =  un/ucdn = dn/(1+tn).
By moving along the indifference curve to the zero-tax steady state C, the government
22c
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Figure 1: Path of Efﬁcient Allocation when bR < 1. The curves represent intra-period in-
difference curves in the (c,n) space, and movements to the southeast represent reductions in
utils. The arrows represent time, and the white circles the static allocation at a given point in
time. The black circle represents the steady state.
increases its capacity to service steady state debt. The beneﬁt of this policy for impatient
agents is that consumption and leisure can be front loaded when the debt is incurred.
4.3 A Decentralization: Managing the portfolio of sovereign and do-
mestic debt
We now explore the time path of aggregates of the economy described above. Starting
from a positive tax economy, we have that labor taxes are falling over time and both
the private agent and the economy as a whole are running down assets. It is not clear,
however, what is happening to government debt itself, which is the difference between
private and aggregate wealth.11 In particular, the government may be borrowing from
abroad to retire domestic debt. We can shed light on ﬁscal deﬁcits through a numerical
example.
Figure 2 depicts the path of a particular parameterization of the example economy.12
11More precisely, because a is after-tax private wealth, the accounting identity is atR/(1 + (1   fk
t)r?) =
At + bt. For t = 0, we have fk
0 = 0, and so a0 = A0 + b0.
12Speciﬁcally, let u(c,n) = logc   w n1+n
1+n . We set n = 0.5 and g = 0.20, and select w and u so that steady
23Giventhatthemodelisquitesimple, wepresentﬁgure2asaguidetointuitionratherthan
a quantitative exercise. Time is the horizontal axis in each panel, and period T denotes the
ﬁrst period in which the borrowing constraint binds. The ﬁrst panel depicts consumption
and labor, and the second panel depicts utility relative to u. Consumption and leisure
decline prior to period T, as the borrowing constraint is slack and agents are relatively
impatient. At period T, utility has fallen to u, as seen in panel (b), and remains there.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, dynamics continue, with leisure continuing to fall but
consumption now rising. This is supported by a declining tax on labor. In particular, as
depicted in panel (c), labor taxes are constant prior to T, but then begin to fall. This is the
front loading of taxes that is optimal when the economy is constrained. Eventually, the
labor taxes converges to zero, as stated in Proposition 2.
The tax on capital income is zero when the economy is unconstrained, and then be-
comes negative (a tax on borrowing) after period T. The tax on borrowing is necessary
to keep the private agents from violating the aggregate borrowing limit. In the steady
state, we have fk
¥ =  
1 bR
r?b , so that agents choose a constant path of consumption at the
after-tax interest rate. The fact that consumption is increasing after period T implies that
fk undershoots its steady state level.
Panel (d) depicts the corresponding path of assets and liabilities. The country’s ag-
gregate net foreign asset position A falls rapidly while the borrowing constraint is slack.
Once constrained, the economy continues to draw down assets and starts to accumulate
foreign liabilities, although the process is slower after period T. Private assets a also fall,
both before and after T. The “deceleration” at period T is less pronounced for private
assets than it is for aggregate assets. This reﬂects that private assets need to be reduced
in order to make labor efﬁciency consistent with the implementability constraint in the
steady state. That is, the ﬂip side of front-loading labor taxes is that the government pays
down domestically held public debt. The government’s total debt, b, is also depicted in
panel (d), which represents the difference between private wealth and aggregate wealth.
As might be expected, government debt is initially increasing while the economy is un-
constrained. However, at some point before the economy becomes constrained, the gov-
ernment starts paying down its debt, and continues to do so after period T. In the limit,
debt is reduced to the point that labor taxes are no longer necessary to fund government
expenditures.
state labor/income is 1 and steady state net foreign liabilities are 65 percent of aggregate income. The
international interest rate is 0.05, and b = 0.94, so private agents discount at a higher rate than the world
interest rate.
24Figure 2: Time Path of Economic Aggregates



















(a) Consumption and Labor
















(b) Utility relative to Deviation Utility

















(c) Labor and Capital Income Tax































(d) Country Assets, Private Assets, and
Government Liabilities
The dynamics depicted in ﬁgure 2 highlight the important role that government debt
and net foreign assets play in supporting the convergence to ﬁrst best labor. The model
does not make a clean prediction for the relative quantities of public debt held domesti-
cally and abroad without further restrictions. That is, if private agents can hold foreign
assets directly, there is an indeterminacy in the following sense: The government can bor-
row from a domestic resident directly, or indirectly by having the domestic resident lend
to foreign investors and then borrowing the same amount from foreign markets.
For many developing economies, private residents do not hold large net foreign asset
positions, and the vast majority of international borrowing and lending is implemented
by the government. If we set private agent foreign assets to zero, then we know that
domestic assets a are equivalent to domestically held government debt.13 Moreover, the
13This follows from the absence of physical capital, but even in an economy with capital, we continue to
25country’s net foreign assets equal government foreign reserves minus sovereign debt.
Therefore, panel (d) of ﬁgure 2 indicates that domestically held government debt is falling
(a), while net sovereign liabilities are increasing (or foreign assets A are falling). There-
fore, the path to efﬁcient labor is one in which the public debt held abroad is increasing
while the public debt held domestically is falling. As a normative prediction, the model
states that the government should pay off domestically held debt ﬁrst, while continu-
ing to borrow from abroad. This is the optimal path to zero labor taxes for an impatient
economy.
4.4 Financing Bailouts
We now stretch the model to address the following scenario: suppose at time t0, the gov-
ernment nationalizes a portion of private debt. In our deterministic model, we treat this
event as unanticipated, which can be a rough proxy for a model in which such an event
is uninsurable and occurs with low probability. We do not address why the government
nationalizes private debt; indeed, in our framework, it is never optimal to do so. Rather,
we address how to ﬁnance the increase in public debt ex post.
To be precise, suppose that the government makes a transfer to the private agent at
time t0.14 The unanticipated transfer requires the government to choose a new path of
taxes. We assume that the transfer is not so large as to induce a default by the govern-
ment. Moreover, the fact that the government re-optimizes tax policy raises the familiar
incentive to tax capital ex post and manipulate the period-zero value of the public debt.
We assume that the government does not try to immediately reclaim it’s bailout in such
a manner. Speciﬁcally, we assume that uc(ct0,nt0)(at0 + T)  ¯ T after the bailout, plac-
ing a ﬂoor on period-t0 private resources evaluated at the new equilibrium prices. The










 ¯ T. (24)
The remaining elements of the problem remain the same, as the period-t0 aggregate net
foreign asset position At0 has not changed.
have a sharp prediction for domestically held debt as long as private foreign assets are zero.
14OurscenarioisparticularlyreminiscentofIreland’sbailoutofitsbanksin2008. Irelandhadconsistently
run ﬁscal surpluses before the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. Nevertheless, public debt as a ratio to GDP ratio went
from 25 percent in 2007 to over 100 percent by 2011, in large part due to the nationalization of private bank


















































Figure 3(a) depicts the experiment:15 at t0, private assets (a) increase by 0.10, which is
ten percent of steady state output, and government debt b increases by the same amount.
The dotted line shows the original path absent the bailout. Panel 3(b) shows that labor
taxes immediately jump. Once the debt constraint binds, which occurs sooner given the
bailout, labor taxes start to decline. That is, labor taxes overshoot in response to the shock,
reﬂecting the incentive to front load distortions. This contrasts with the standard “ran-
15The parameters are the same as in ﬁgure 2. We assume A = a =  .20 and b = 0 at the time of the
bailout.
27dom walk” intuition of optimal taxation in the presence of uninsurable shocks (Barro,
1979, Aiyagari et al., 2002). Indeed, when bR = 1 in our framework, taxes would jump
up at t0 and then remain constant thereafter. However, in the patient environment, the
country does not face binding debt constraints in the long run and thus has no need to
front load taxes.
The path of b indicates that the government starts to run a surplus soon after the
bailout and b begins to decline. We do not depict the change in allocation, but both con-
sumption and labor fall. The fact that labor declines, despite the income effect of the drop
in consumption, reﬂects the increase in labor taxes. In this particular example, the substi-
tution effect wins out. Also not depicted is the tax on capital income, which remains at
zero until the debt constraint binds and then becomes negative.
While highly stylized, this scenario suggests the value of front loading the ﬁnancing
of bailouts. In this environment, the sharp increase in tax revenue is necessary for the
government to pay down its newly acquired debt and allow the private sector to resume
borrowing. While this is highly distortionary, it is necessary to ensure the economy ser-
vices its large stock of steady state debt. Or, viewed from the perspective of ﬁnancial
markets, absent the front loading of tax revenues, the market will not be willing to allow
the continued accumulation of net foreign liabilities.
5 Extensions
In this section we consider how our results translate to two alternative environments. The
ﬁrst is the case when the household faces a debt constraint. This analysis studies the link
between private debt constraints and the sovereign debt constraints studied above, and
we show how our analysis carries over. The second case is a closed economy. Given the
focus on the relatively low world interest rate, it may not be clear at this point that the
result regarding front loading labor taxes carries over to a closed economy. It is therefore
useful to show that the result rests on the wedge between the inter-temporal marginal rate
of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation, whether the MRT is determined
by the domestic capital stock or the world interest rate.
285.1 Household Debt Constraints
In this subsection we extend our benchmark model to incorporate limited commitment
on the part of the private agent. Speciﬁcally, we assume that agents face “household debt







bs tus   Vt (fws,Ts,csgst)  0 for all t  1, (HHDC)
where Vt represents the value of repudiating debt at time t. Following Kehoe and Levine
(1993), the constraint captures a limited commitment environment in which agents that
default are permanently excluded from assets markets, but continue to participate in spot
labor markets. In our environment, this implies working in the labor market. We also
allow for additional enforcement mechanisms that the government may have available,







u(cswsns + Ts,ns). (25)
Note that after a default, consumption is labor income (cswsns) minus wage garnishment
plus transfers if any (Ts).
The presence of equilibrium prices in the constraint set opens up room for externalities
stemming from private borrowing constraints, a feature of limited commitment environ-
ments emphasized by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and a large subsequent literature. For a
given wage and transfer sequence, note that Vt is differentiable and concave in household
consumption and labor.
We do not include an initial period debt constraint given that maximizing (1) will sat-
isfy the initial constraint, if feasible, and we assume that it is always feasible. In particular,
we assume that the constraint set has a non-empty interior. That is, a0 is such that for any
bounded sequence of positive prices there exists an interior point in the constraint set. A
sufﬁcient condition for this is that it is feasible for the agent to supply n < ¯ n in the initial
period and save part of that period’s labor income.
The households problem is now the same as before, with the addition of the sequence
of constraints (HHDC). Let btgt  0 be the multiplier on period t’s constraint, and, as
before, q be the multiplier on the household budget constraint (BC).16
16We solve the household’s and government’s problem using Lagrange multiplier techniques. As noted



















These conditions, the constraints, and the complementary slackness conditions character-
ize the unique solution to the household’s problem.
Note that as before q > 0, and so the debt constraints affect inter-temporal decisions,




The debt constraints (and their associated multipliers) can be viewed as an inter-temporal














btGt(uc(ct,nt)ct + un(ct,nt)nt)  uc(c0,n0)a0, (28)
which is the revised implementability condition. This expression differs from (P.2) due to
the presence of Gt, reﬂecting the shadow costs of the household’s borrowing constraint.
The deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium remains the same as the benchmark, with
the stipulation that prices and allocations are consistent with the household’s optimiza-
before, there are technical issues regarding the nature of the multipliers in inﬁnite dimensional problems.
We proceed by assuming the existence and validity of these multipliers. A sufﬁcient condition in this
context is that u is bounded. See the appendix for more details.
30tion in the presence of debt constraints, given a wage-garnishment policy ct.
Recall that the primal approach to solving for efﬁcient allocations treated the imple-
mentability condition as a constraint. The difﬁculty here is that (28) depends on the mul-
tipliers Gt as well as the allocation. The presence of debt constraints implies that an equi-
librium allocation may be supported by multiple price sequences as the Euler Equation
holds only with weak inequality. Fiscal policy determines not only the allocation, but
also the prices conditional on an allocation. For each of these candidate price sequences,
we have associated multipliers gt to satisfy the household’s ﬁrst order conditions. Nev-
ertheless, the following proposition states we can purse the primal approach despite the
private borrowing constraints:
Proposition 4. An allocation fct,nt,ktg¥
t=0 can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium if
and only if: (a) the resource constraint (RC?) holds; (b) the household debt constraint holds at the
equilibrium wage sequence and zero transfers:
Vt (fusg¥
s=tjfws,0,csg)  0,for all t  1, (29)
where us = u(cs,ns), ws =  un(cs,ns)/uc(cs,ns); (c) the sovereign debt constraints hold; and




bt(uc(ct,nt)ct + un(ct,nt)nt)  uc(c0,n0)a0. (IC)
This proposition states that we can search for efﬁcient allocations without concerning
ourselves with Gt, as long as we restrict attention to allocations that satisfy the household
debt constraints. The reason we can ignore the wedge in the private agent’s Euler Equa-
tion stems from their equivalence to a tax on borrowing. In particular, consider an agent
that wishes to borrow more but is constrained from doing so. The multiplier gt is the
shadow cost of this constraint. The government can replace gt with a tax on borrowing,
so the agent is indifferent to the constraint at the original allocation (that is, the Euler
Equation holds with equality given the tax). This replaces the shadow cost with an actual
tax. This is always feasible for the government as long as the tax raises revenue. That is,
as long as asset positions are non-positive when the debt constraint binds. As the devi-
ation utility balances the budget period-by-period by deﬁnition (as agents lose access to
ﬁnancial markets), and delivers the same utility when the constant binds, this will always
be the case. In this manner, the government can raise revenue without distorting the al-
location by taxing borrowing at the debt constraint. The intuition is the same as the well
31known equivalence of an import tariff and a import quota – both restrict the quantity of
imports, but differ only in how the tariff revenue is shared.
The only difference between the problem with and without private debt constraints is
therefore the constraint (29) and the potential availability of additional enforcement tools
ct. Absent these additional tools, the government will have an incentive to distort spot
wages to relax the household’s borrowing constraint. In this way, labor taxes will, in gen-
eral, not be zero, even in the absence of ﬁscal expenditures. This is a crude mechanism to
enforce private debt contracts, as the distortion affects all workers along the equilibrium
path.
A more realistic scenario is where additional tools (ranging from wage garnishment
to debtor’s prisons) may be available. The question then becomes one of whether the
government is willing to enforce contracts directly. If the household accumulates enough
foreign debt, the government may not choose to enforce these contracts, even if it can.
However, this is the same question as whether the government repays its own debt, and
thus equivalent to the type of sovereign debt constraints explored in our benchmark for-
mulation. We conclude by formally stating this equivalence in regard to long run labor
taxes:
Corollary 1 (Corollary to Proposition 2 with Private Debt Constraints). Suppose the gov-
ernment can enforce private debt contracts directly (i.e., ct = 0 is feasible for all t), then under the
assumptions of Proposition 2 limt!¥ tn
t = 0.
5.2 A Closed Economy
In this subsection, we show how our results carry over to a closed economy. In a closed
economy, all capital is owned by domestic agents, and the source tax on capital, tk
t , is
equivalent to the residence based tax on capital, fk
t, so we can set the last one to zero
without loss of generality. It follows then that pt = qt and the aggregate resource con-
straint is the national income accounting identity:
ct + gt + kt+1   (1  d)kt  F(kt,nt). (RC)
Market clearing requires that the private agents’ initial wealth corresponds to their hold-
ings of government debt plus the domestic capital stock: at = bt + pt 1kt/pt, where the
fact that kt is adjusted by the inter-temporal price pt 1/pt reﬂects the fact that at and bt
are in period-t (after tax) units, while kt is the amount invested at the end of period t   1.
32We restrict tk
0 = 0 to eliminate the initial capital levy solution.
For simplicity, we assume that the private agent’s can commit to debt contracts, and
the only constraints are on the sovereign. This will avoid the need to discuss the addi-
tional notation of the previous subsection.
The requirements of a closed economy competitive equilibrium are the same as their
open economy counterparts, with the appropriate adjustment to the resource constraint,
and recognition that initial capital is a state variable in a closed economy:
Deﬁnition 4. A closed economy competitive equilibrium from an initial position (k0,b0) con-




t g with tk
0 = 0, non-negative lump-sum transfers
fTtg, and quantities fct,nt,ktg such that (i) rt, rk
t, pt, qt satisfy equations and (2), (3), (10);
(ii) households optimize given prices and taxes subject to their budget constraint (BC); (iii) ﬁrms
maximize proﬁts given prices and taxes; that is, equations (8) and (9) hold; (iv) the government
budget constraint (11) holds; (v) the sequence of closed-economy aggregate resource constraints
(RC) hold; and (vi) the sovereign debt constraints (12) hold for all t.
As before, we use the primal approach. The closed economy version of Proposition 1
is:
Proposition 5. An allocation is consistent with a closed economy competitive equilibrium if and













and the sequence of closed-economy resource constraints (RC) hold.
Equation (12) continues to deﬁne the additional sovereign constraints on the problem.
The natural interpretation of (12) in a closed economy is one of a lower bound on aggre-
gate savings, rather than an upper bound on aggregate debt. In this regard, the dynastic
model with insufﬁcient private altruism (relative to the government’s Pareto weights) is
perhaps the most relevant interpretation. For the closed economy, we add an additional
assumption on the functions Wt:
Assumption 5. ¶Ws/¶kt  08s,t.
This assumption insures that additional capital (weakly) tightens the constraint. This
is consistent, for example, with more capital raising the incentive of the government to
renege on its tax promises.
33The deﬁnition for an efﬁcient allocation given in Deﬁnition 2 continues to hold with
the relevant notion of equilibrium being a closed economy competitive equilibrium. To
characterize (interior) efﬁcient allocations, let btyt denote the multiplier on the time t






























































The initial period ﬁrst order conditions (t = 0) are adjusted in the same way as they were
in the open economy formulation.
We can now state the closed economy version of Proposition 2:
Proposition 6. [Zero Labor Tax in the Long-run – Closed Economy] Suppose that Assumptions
1, 3 and 5 hold. If an (interior) efﬁcient allocation satisﬁes no-immiseration and if:
(a) there exist M > 0 and T such that 1 > M > b(Fk(kt,nt) + 1  d) for all t > T;
then limt!¥ tn
t = 0.
The impatience condition (a) replaces Assumption 2 in Proposition 2. Intuitively, an
impatience condition for a close economy involves b(Fk(kt,nt) + 1  d), as the relevant
marginal rate of transformation in a closed economy is the marginal product of capital.
Differently from the small open economy case, impatience now imposes a restriction on
the allocation rather than the exogenous parameters. In particular, the new impatience
condition implies that capital is above the modiﬁed golden rule from the perspective of
the private agents. That is, capital is “over-accumulated” relative to the private agents’
discount factor. In the closed economy, we impose that ¶Ws/¶kt  0, which places some
restrictions on the reasons why capital is above the modiﬁed golden rule. In particular,
it implies that all else equal, reducing capital (weakly) relaxes the constraint, so the over-
accumulation of capital is not hard-wired.18 Rather, the over-accumulation of capital is
required to ensure a certain level of future generations’ utility.
17As in the open economy case, we leave to the appendix discussion of the existence of Lagrange multi-
pliers.
18This rules out such constraints as k  k > k?, where k? is the modiﬁed golden rule capital. It allows
34In the open economy, we proposed the intuition that the efﬁcient allocation maxi-
mizes steady state aggregate debt (see proposition 3). In a closed economy, aggregate
debt is zero by deﬁnition. Nevertheless, a similar intuition carries through to the closed
economy case. The constraints in the closed economy ensure that sufﬁcient resources are
provided to future agents. From the perspective of the private agents, the efﬁcient allo-
cation in a closed economy is distorted by inducing savings, which in turn is necessary
to sustain a relatively high level of future utility. The closed-economy equivalent of max-
imizing steady state aggregate debt is to minimizing the amount of capital left for future
generations.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that the efﬁcient allocation converges to the steady state allo-
cation (c¥,n¥,k¥), with steady state ﬁscal expenditure g. Then the efﬁcient allocation
minimizes the steady state capital necessary to sustain steady state utility:
Proposition 7. [Minimal Steady State Capital] Suppose the efﬁcient allocation converges to a
steady state. Under the conditions of Proposition 6, the efﬁcient allocation converges to the mini-






c  F(k,n)   dk   g.
This proposition highlights the link between the closed and open economy problems.
In both cases, there is a ﬂoor on savings (or a ceiling on debt). Fiscal policy in the presence
of impatience is designed to exhaust these constraints in order to maximize front loading.
This requires efﬁcient production in the steady state, or zero tax on labor inputs.
6 Conclusion
This paper characterized the optimal ﬁscal policy when agents are relatively impatient. A
deﬁning feature of the optimal policy is that labor taxes are front loaded. A consequence
the standard limited commitment constraints in which more capital makes deviation more proﬁtable. Such
a restriction on W was unnecessary in the open economy case as any over-accumulation of capital did not
affect inter-temporal prices, which were pinned down by international ﬁnancial markets.
35of such a policy is that the transition to the steady involves a conservative ﬁscal policy
in which the government accumulates enough assets to ﬁnance expenditures in the ab-
sence of labor tax revenue. While the ﬁscal authority may run surpluses, the economy as
a whole is accumulating foreign liabilities. As noted in the introduction, this normative
description does not resemble the observed policy in many indebted economies. Such
economies frequently run ﬁscal deﬁcits and back load taxes. Nevertheless, the mech-
anism rationalizes why taxes are front loaded rather than smoothed in response to an
unanticipated ﬁscal shock. In particular, front loading allows the economy to aggres-
sively access international debt markets, which is the relevant concern in our benchmark
scenario.
One potential drawback of our deterministic environment (or an extension with state-
contingent debt) is the inability to speak to spikes in sovereign risk premia as a country’s
borrowing capacity becomes saturated. In our framework, limited commitment is mani-
fested through quantity rationing. The increase in the cost of borrowing is reﬂected in the
accumulating Lagrange multipliers on the debt constraints; that is, via the shadow cost of
debt rather than a change in the market price. Given this symmetry, the desire to lower
the cost of borrowing in a model with explicit default may also call for front loading of
labor taxes. Similarly, the model does not encompass other potential frictions in the asset
markets, such as illiquidity of public or private debt, that may play a role in ﬁscal crises.
Such additional complications do not a priori challenge the argument for front loading
tax revenues, but we leave for future research a full analysis. Nevertheless, the intuition
behind the result is likely to play a role in other environments. Namely, an economy that
wishes to front load consumption and leisure should operate as efﬁciently as possible in
the long run to maximize its debt servicing capacity. As private indebtedness does not
undermine efﬁciency to the same extent as public indebtedness, this requires the ﬁscal
authority to “make room” by front loading its labor tax revenue.
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38Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The only if part: Take the budget constraint of the consumer (BC) and substitute








  uc(c0,n0)a0 = uc(c0,n0)T  0
where the last inequality follows from T  0 and that uc  0. The necessity that the
resource constraint and the sovereign debt constraints hold follows from the deﬁnition of
equilibria.


































  a0  0,
q = uc(c0,n0).
Now note that pt satisﬁes (3) by construction. So part (i) of the equilibrium deﬁnition
is satisﬁed. Given the deﬁnition of q  0, wt and pt, we get that conditions (16) and (17)
39are satisﬁed as well. Note that the budget constraint of the consumer is satisﬁed with Tt
as deﬁned above. So part (ii) is satisﬁed.
For part (iii), note that from the deﬁnition of rk
t and tn
t and tk
t it follows that equations
(8) and (9) hold. So part (iii) is satisﬁed. Part (v) holds as well, by hypothesis of the
Proposition. We now show that part (iv) holds. We don’t appeal directly to Walras’ law
because the budget constraint of the government is not necessarily holding with equality.






gt + Tt   tn





























































+ a0 = a0






gt + Tt   tn









 A0   a0 =  b0 (34)
And thus part (iv) holds.
Taken together, the above implies that the sequences of prices, quantities and taxes
we have constructed is a competitive equilibrium. So the allocation is consistent with an
open economy competitive equilibrium.
40Proof of Lemma 1




t=0. Let us ﬁrst prove that con-
sumption is bounded above zero in the limit: liminft!¥ c?
t > 0. Towards a contradiction,
suppose that this is not true. Hence, we can ﬁnd a t0 > T such that c?








with ct0 = ec and ct = c?
t for t  t0. The ﬁrst inequality follows from strict monotonicity
of ut0 with respect to ct0 and of Wt0 with respect to ut0, while the second follows from
the hypothesis of Lemma 1. But then this implies that the sovereign debt constraint is
violated at time t0, generating a contradiction.
The proof of limsupt!¥ n?
t < ¯ n is similar, and we omit it.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let fc?,n?,k?g be an interior efﬁcient allocation. To eliminate the need to work in an in-
ﬁnite dimensional space,19 consider the subproblem (PT) which equals problem (P) with
the additional restriction that fct,ntg = fc?
t,n?
tg for all t > T and kt = k?
t for all t  0.
Clearly, fc?,n?,k?g is a solution to subproblem (PT). Note that subproblem (PT) has a ﬁ-
nitenumberofconstraints, andtoavoiddealingwiththeregularityconditions,20 weusea
version of the Lagrangian theorem stated in Luenberger (1969) chapter 9.4 problem 3. Ap-
plied to our setting, it implies that there exist a non-negative vector frT,mT,hT,lT
0,...,lT
Tg,
not identically zero, where fmT,hT,lT
0,...,lT
Tg represent the multipliers associated to con-
straints (P.1), (P.2), and (P.3) respectively; and are such that the standard complementary
conditions hold, together with the following ﬁrst order conditions:
19Working directly in inﬁnite dimensional space is not an issue if we restrict attention to bounded utility
functions (that is, u(0,n) >  ¥ and u(c, ¯ n) >  ¥). In this case, the constraint set maps our commod-
ity space into the space of bounded sequences (`¥), and it can be shown that the associated multipliers
are summable sequences of non-negative numbers. In order to extend our results to unbounded utility
functions, we pursue an alternative approach.
20The difﬁculty with the standard regularity conditions stems from the nature of the sovereign debt con-
straint. In particular, the optimal allocation may be such that the gradient of the constraint set does not
have full rank. For example, an extreme case that cannot be ruled out in our setting is if there is only one al-






































for t 2 f0,1,..,Tg and where 1f0g is an indicator function taking value of 1 when evalu-
ated at 0. The ﬁrst equation is the ﬁrst order condition with respect to consumption and
the second with respect to labor. Note that the difference with the usual necessity theorem
is the presence of rT  0 that multiplies the objective function’s contribution to the ﬁrst
order conditions (rT is a multiplier of the objective function).



























for all t 2 f0,..,Tg.
We ﬁrst proof the following simple lemma:














as long as c > 0 and n > 0.
Proof. Normalityguaranteesthatthetermsinsidethebracketsarenon-positive. Ourstrict
concavity assumptions guarantee that at least one of them is strictly negative. To see this,
suppose not. Then we have that uc/un = ucn/unn from the second term, and from the
ﬁrst we get ucc  
u2
cn
unn = 0 which is a contradiction of our strict concavity assumption.
42We can now state that the multiplier in the resource constraint is always strictly posi-
tive:
Lemma A4. Under assumptions 1 and 3, in any subproblem (PT), with T  1, the resource
constraint binds (i.e., mT > 0).

















Using Lemma A3, it follows that, for the above equation to hold, hT must be zero. Using









for all t  0. Given that lT
t  0 and that ¶Wt/¶ut > 0 by Assumption 3, it follows then
that rT = lT




Then, we have the following Lemma:
Lemma A5. There exists a non-negative constant C1 such that hT/mT = C1 for any subproblem
(PT) with T  1.



























which follows from equation (37), Lemma A3 and Lemma A4. The left hand side of the
above equation is a constant for all T  1, as it is only a function of the allocation at
time t = 1: fc?
1,n?
1,k?
1g. Hence, hT/mT is constant. Non-negativity follows from the non-
negativity of the Lagrange multipliers.






s). Remember that b(1 + r?
t ) > 0 for all t. And then,
b(1 + r?
t ) < M1 < 1 for sufﬁciently large t implies that limt!¥ bt/qt = 0. Using Lemma























Now note that for sufﬁciently large t, ct > ec for some ec > 0 and nt < en for some
en < ¯ n, by the no-immiseration condition. Assumption 1 (iv) then guarantees that the
terms inside the square brackets are bounded. Taking the limits as t ! ¥, it follows then
that limt!¥ tn
t = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The maximal steady state debt problem in the proposition is a convex program-
ming problem. Let yu and yk denote the multipliers on the utility and capital constraints.
The ﬁrst order conditions are
yuuc(c,n) = 1
yuun(c,n) =  Fn(k,n)
yk = Fk(k,n)   r?   d
where we have omitted the normalization term (1+r?)/r? from the objective function as
this term does not affect choices. These conditions, the constraints, plus the complemen-
tary slackness conditions are necessary and sufﬁcient for an optimum. The conditions of
proposition 2 ensure that yu > 0 (that is, uc and un are ﬁnite for any allocation that yields
weakly greater utility than the steady state).
Let x = (c,n,k,yu,yk) 2 <5
+ represent an arbitrary allocation and multipliers, and x?
denote the x that satisﬁes the maximal debt ﬁrst order conditions. Deﬁne the function
44H(x) : <5
+ ! <5 by:
H(x) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
yuuc(c,n)   1,
yuun(c,n) + Fn(k,n),
yk   Fk(k,n) + r? + d,
yu (u(c,n)   u(c¥,n¥)),
yk (k   k¥).
Note that the strict concavity of u and F ensures that x? is the unique zero of this function
such that the constraints are satisﬁed.21
Now let xt = (ct,nt,kt,yt
u,yt















¶kt from the efﬁcient allocation ﬁrst
order conditions (equations 16 - 18). Note that our assumptions on V and W ensure these
are non-negative. From the efﬁcient allocation ﬁrst order conditions, we have:
H(xt) =
8
> > > > > > > <



























u (u(ct,nt)   u(c¥,n¥)),
yt
k (kt   k¥).
From the conditions of Proposition 2, the ﬁrst two elements of H(xt) are converging to
zero as t becomes large. The other terms converge to zero by deﬁnition as the allocation
converges to the steady state. In particular, H(x¥) = H(limt!¥ xt) = 0. As x? is the
unique zero of H(x), we have that x¥ = x?.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let’s proceed by contradiction. Suppose that for some t > 0, Wt = U and Wt+1 >
U. Then, from the ﬁrst order conditions we know that ct  ct+1 and nt  nt+1. This
implies that ut  u(ct,nt)  u(ct+1,nt+1)  ut+1. However note that ut + b(ut+1 +
but+2 + ..) = U and that ut+1 + but+2 + b2ut+3 + .. > U by the hypothesis of the lemma.
Then, it must be that ut + bU < U, and thus ut < (1   b)U. From above, we know then
that ut+1  ut < (1  b)U. Using that ut+1 + but+2 +... > U, we have that ut+2 + but+3 +
21We omit the constraints themselves as elements of H, as the steady state efﬁcient allocation will satisfy
the constraints by deﬁnition.
45.. > (U   ut+1)/b > (U   (1   b)U)/b = U. It follows then that at t + 2 the borrowing
constraint is not binding and thus, ut+2  ut+1. Proceeding in this fashion we can show
that ut+s  (1   b)U for all s > 1. But this violates the borrowing constraint as it implies
that å
¥
s=0 bsut+s+1 < U.
Proof of Proposition 4
We solve the household’s problem in the presence of a sequence of debt constraints us-
ing Lagrangian techniques. If u is bounded, then the constraint set maps the commodity
space into `¥, the space of bounded sequences. Standard results (see Luenberger, 1969)
imply that necessary conditions for an optimum is that the associated Lagrangian is at
a stationary point. One technical detail is that the multipliers are from the dual of `¥,
which is larger than `1, the space of summable sequences. However, it can be shown that
for the private agent’s problem, the multipliers are indeed sequences of summable, non-
negative numbers (see Dechert, 1982 and Rustichini, 1998). For environments in which
u is not bounded over the relevant commodity space (e.g., u(0,n) = u(c, ¯ n) =  ¥), we
cannot ensure the validity of the Lagrangian with summable multipliers. We proceed as-
suming that if u is unbounded, such multipliers do indeed exist and the usual ﬁrst order
and complementary slackness conditions are necessary at an interior optimum. This as-
sumption is only necessary for the case in which household’s face debt constraints. The
main propositions in the case with only sovereign debt constraints are proven without
these additional assumptions.
Proof. The if part: The “if part” follows from the proof of Proposition 1 above. With
gt = 0 for all t, the household’s ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed at the deﬁned prices
and allocations, as well as the complementary slackness on the household debt constraint.
The only if part: For part (a), the necessity of the resource constraint follows from the
deﬁnition of equilibrium. It follows from 26 that the budget constraint of the household
must hold with equality in a competitive equilibrium. The ﬁrst order conditions plus
the household’s budget constraint imply (7) holds for a sequence of transfers Tt  0 and
a sequence of gt  0, with g0 = 0 and gt = 0 whenever Vt > 0. We need to show
that this allocation must satisfy the household’s ﬁrst order and complementary slackness
conditions at gt = 0 for all t. We begin with the following claim:
Lemma A6. Suppose that fct,ntg solves the household’s problem for a sequence of prices (pt,wt),
46punishments ct, and transfers Tt. Let Gt denote the associated multipliers. If there exists a t0 such




btGt [uc(ct,nt)(ct   Tt) + un(ct,nt)nt]  0. (39)
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists t0 such that Vt0 = 0 but the left
hand side of (39) is strictly positive. From the household’s ﬁrst order conditions, we can




pt [ct   Tt   wtnt] > 0. (40)








bt t0u(wt ˜ nt + Tt, ˜ nt),
where ˜ nt  argmaxˆ nt u(wt ˆ nt + Tt, ˆ nt). The last inequality follows from the upper bound
assumption on deviation utility and that ct 2 [0,1]. Moreover, deﬁning ˜ ct  wt ˜ nt + Tt,








pt(˜ ct   Tt   wt ˜ nt) = 0,
a contradiction of (40).





t,ctg isacompetitiveequilibrium, thenfct,nt,kt, ˜ Tt,
˜ pt,wt,tk
t ,tn
t , ˜ fk
t,ctg is also a competitive equilibrium, where
˜ pt = bt uc(ct,nt)
uc(c0,n0)
,8t. (41)
That is, prices are such that Gt = 1 for all t.
Proof. Deﬁne D  å
¥
t=0 (pt   ˜ pt)(ct   wtnt   Tt), as the impact on the budget constraint






˜ pt (ct   wtnt   Tt) + D.
If D  0, then the allocation satisﬁes the household’s budget constraint under the new


















. Note that l0 = 0, lt = lt 1 if gt = 0 and lt > lt 1 if gt > 0. Let




















btGt [uc(ct,nt)(ct   Tt) + un(ct,nt)nt]
+ ....
From lemma A6, å
¥
t=tk btGt [uc(ct,nt)(ct   Tt) + un(ct,nt)nt]  0 for all tk 2 T, and so D 
0. To ensure that the household’s budget constraint holds with equality at the alternative
prices, deﬁne ˜ T0 = T0   D  0. The sequence of ˜ ft can be recovered from ˜ pt as usual.
The wages and source-based taxes can be left as in the original allocation and satisfy the
conditions of equilibrium.
We now show that any equilibrium with positive transfers can be supported with zero
transfers:
Lemma A8. If fct,nt,kt,Tt, pt,wt,tk
t ,tn
t ,fk
t,ctg is a competitive equilibrium, then there exists
an alternative equilibrium with ˜ Tt = 0 for all t  1.
Proof. From the preceding lemma, we only need consider equilibria for which Gt = 1 for
all t, as any alternative equilibrium can be supported as a Gt = 1 equilibrium. As transfer
48only affect the household’s problem, we need to check that the original allocation satis-
ﬁes the household’s problem at the original prices but with new sequence of transfers.
Consider ˜ T0 = å
¥
t=0 ptTt, and ˜ Tt = 0 for all t  1. Substituting ˜ Tt for Tt has no im-
pact on the household’s budget constraint, by construction. Note that Vt (fws,Tsgst) 
Vt (fws,0gst) for all t by monotonicity of deviation utility with respect to transfers.
Therefore the new allocation satisﬁes the household debt constraints. The fact that Gt = 1
implies that complementary slackness continues to hold. Therefore, the original alloca-
tion with the new sequences of transfers continues to satisfy the household’s problem at
the original prices.
Lemmas A6 through A8 prove that any competitive equilibrium can be implemented
with zero transfers after the ﬁrst period and Gt = 1 for all t. Using the fact that T0  0, we
can rewrite (7) as (IC).
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Given the result of Proposition 4, the efﬁcient allocation problem with household
debt constraints is the same as the benchmark problem (P) with the addition of constraint
(29) and the additional choice sequence fctg¥
t=0. The policy of setting ct = 0 for all t
minimizes the sequence of Vt’s, and thus maximizes the set of allocations that satisfy the
household’s debt constraint without affecting any other aspects of the problem. Any ef-
ﬁcient allocation must therefore satisfy this constraint, and we can thus conﬁne attention
to the problem subject to V(ct,ntj0,0,0)  0. Note that setting ct = 0 is full garnishment
of wages and thus removes equilibrium prices from the constraint set, making the con-
straint identical to a sovereign debt constraint. This renders the problem isomorphic to
the benchmark model, and so the result of Proposition 2 holds.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of the closed economy case follows that of the open economy (Proposition 1),
and we omit the details.
49Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The proof of the closed economy result follows the open economy proof (Proposi-
tion2). Theonlydifferenceisweknowfaceasequenceofresourceconstraints, ratherthan
a single present value constraint. As before, let fc?,n?,k?g be an interior efﬁcient alloca-












s) + 1   d > 0 for d 2 (0,1). Let hT be the multipliers on (IC’), btyT
t be
the multiplier on the sequence of resource constraints (RC), and btlT
t be the multiplier on
the sequence of debt constraints. As in the proof of Proposition 2, we let rT  0 be the
multiplier on the objective function. The ﬁrst order conditions are:












































for all t 2 f0,...,Tg, and
yT













for all t  f1,...,Tg.
As in the open economy case, in any subproblem (PT), with T  1, the resource con-
straint binds for every 1  t  T (i.e., yT
t > 0). The proof follows that of lemma A4 and
we omit it.




































































¶kt  0. Iterating on this last inequality back-























































































   .
The assumptions listed in Proposition 6 imply bt/˜ qt ! 0, and that the ﬁnal term is ﬁnite.
Therefore tn
t ! 0.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Write the Lagrangian for the minimal capital problem:
qL = k + x (u(c¥,n¥)   u(c,n)) + r(c + g + dk   F(k,n)).
where y and r are the associated Lagrange multipliers. As in the open economy case
(Proposition 3), we have strictly convex programming problem. We can write the ﬁrst
order conditions as:
















where the ﬁrst condition ensures that r > 0. The conditions of proposition 6 ensure
that c is bounded away from zero and n away from ¯ n. This ensures that x > 0 as well.
Deﬁne x = (c,n,k,x,r) and Hc(x) as the left hand side of the above conditions plus the
complementary slackness expressions. Let x? denote the (unique) zero of Hc(x) such that
the constraints are satisﬁed.































where we use the fact that the bracketed term in the ﬁrst expression is equal to Fk(kt,nt) 
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xt (u(ct,nt)   u(c¥,n¥)),
rt (c + g + dkt   F(kt,nt)).
The ﬁrst two terms converge to zero under the conditions for proposition 6, and the re-
maining terms converge to zero by deﬁnition of the steady state and the closed economy
aggregate resource constraint (RC). The constraints are satisﬁed by deﬁnition. Therefore,
Hc(x¥) = 0 = Hc(x?), and the fact that Hc has a unique zero implies that x¥ coincides
with the minimal steady state capital allocation.
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